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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred

upon

this

Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann.

78 2a 3 (k) (as amended

originated

the Third Judicial District Court, in and for

in

Salt Lake County, State

1992).

of Utah, involving a probate matter-

It was originally appealed to the Supreme
of

Utah,

Appeals.

which

has

This action

transferred

it

to

Court of the State
the Utah Court of

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The controlling statute
30-1-4.5

(1953

determining

as

the

to

this case is Utah Code Ann.

amended).

validity

statute requires action
one

in

This

of

to

statute

provides

for

marriage not solemnized.

The

be brought, in this case, within

year after the termination of the marriage
determine

the

must

be

established

administrative order establishing that
and

There ar&

validity of the marriage.

separate elements which

relationship

the

five

by a Court or

marriage existed

arouse out of a contract between two consenting parties.

Each point must be manifested

in

any form and may be proved

under the same general rules of evidence

as

facts

in other

cases.

1.

The

statute

giving consent.

requires

Standard

the

parties

be

capable of

of Review is a question of law and

is reviewed for correctness.

Kimbal1 vs.

Campbel1, 699 P.2d

714, (Utah, 1985).

2.

The

parties

entering a solemnized
chapter (Title 3 0 ) .

must

have

marriage

legally

capable

of

under the provisions of this

Standard of Review

and is reviewed for correctness.

3.

been

is a question of law

Kimbal1, supra.

The parties must have cohabitated.

Standard of

Review

is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness.

Kimball.9 supra,

4.

The

parties

must

have

rights, duties, and obligations.
question

of

law

mutually

assumed

Standard

of

marital

Review

and is reviewed for correctness.

is

a

Kimbal1.

supra.*

5.

The parties must have

held

themselves

out

as and

have acquired a uniform and general rep\-vtat.ion as husband and
wife.

Standard

of

Review

reviewed for correctness.

6.

is

facts

between

Martin

in

his

question

brief

concerning

and is

the

relationship

Van Nood and Susan Gustaveson, leading to an
of the statute.

is

and

question

law

Sorensen) has greatly misstated

incorrect interpretation
a

of

Kimbal1 « supra.

The Appellant (Orin

certain

a

of

law

is reviewed

Standard of Review
for

correctness.

Kimbal1 « supra.
7.

Appellant Sorensen has inputed Legislative intent to

the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1953 as
amended) which does not exist.
8.

Appellee Van Nood should be awarded costs and

attorney fees as provided by Utah Rules App. P. 33(a) as the
Appellant Sorensen has not cited any Legislative intent or
statutory authority to support his argument.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

1.

Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended)
See addendum 1

2.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 (a)
See addendum 2

-4-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal,

steming

from

a

trial to determine

that Mr. Martin Van Nood and Ms. Susan Gustaveson had entered
into

a

marriage

contract and become common law husband and

wife prior to the death of Susan on October 19, 1992.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Ms. Susan
apparently
brother

R.

Gustaveson

intestate.

of

the

died

Appellant,

on
Orin

October
Thomas

19,

1992,

Sorensen,

decedent filed a petition to determine that

the decedent died intestate and to have himself appointed the
personal
Melvin

representative of her estate.
Gustaveson

Mr.

Van

Nood

and

filed a counter—petition objecting to the

petition of the Appellant and requesting that Mr. Van Nood be
appointed the personal representative of the decedent, as the
person having priority as the decedent's husband.

The

matter

came

before

the Probate Judge, Richard H.

Moffat, and the matter was transferred to the trial calendar,
and Judge Richard H. Moffat was assigned to the case.
-5-

DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT

The
1993.

matter

After

came on for trial on the 25th day of March,

a four hour

trial

the

Court

decedent (Susan Gustaveson) and Martin

Van

held

that

the

Nood had entered

into a marital contract under the provisions of Utah Cod Ann.
30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended)

and that a valid marriage existed

between the two parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Susan
intestate.

R.
Her

Gustaveson died October 19, 1992,
sole

surviving

blood

apparently

relative

was

the

Appellant, Orin Thomas Sorensen, her brother.

Ms. Gustaveson had been
entered
with

divorced

in 1982;

into a marital relationship with

whom

she

October, 1992.

lived

from

June,

1988

Martin

and in 19S8
Van

Nood,

until her death in

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The controlling statute
30-1-4.5

(1953

as

are

arguments

in

amended).

this case is Utah Code Ann.
Appellee

Martin

Van

Nood's

addressed to each of the five criteria of the

statute, required to

be

proven to establish that a marriage

existed between the Appellee Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson.

The statute requires that the parties were:
1.

Capable

2.

Legally

of

giving consent to a marriage

capable

marriage under Utah

Code

3.

Cohabitated.

4.

Mutually

of

entering

Ann.

assumed

into

a

contract.
solemnized

Title 30 (1953 as amended).

marital

rights,

duties

and

obligations.
5.

Held

themselves

out

and

acquired

a

uniform and

general reputation as husband and wife.

Appellee Van Nood further
correctly
trail

argues

that

concluded from the facts and

that

the lower Court

evidence

aduced

at

Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were husband and

wife.
The Legislature provided
criteria
order

by

shall

be

finding

in

the statute that the above

established by Court
evidence

form and proved under

the

or

Administrative

of a marriage manifested in any
same general rules of evidence as

facts in other cases.
-7-

The

Appellee

Martin

Van Nood has proved

all

of

elements of the statute by a preponderance of evidence.
the

controlling

are

facts

Appellant

Sorensen;

supported

by

and

by

that

and

large

undisputed

the findings

of

fact

the
That
by
are

the evidence and support the conclusion of the

trial judge that a marriage

existed

between Martin Van Nood

and Susan Gustaveson at the date of her death.

The
evidence

Appellant
in

Sorensen has made some misstatements

concluding the relationship of Mr. Van Nood and

Ms. Gustaveson was "rocky".

This

is

not the case.

also inferred that the Legislature mandated
certain

facts

of

concerning

establish a marriage

under

property

the

ownership

finding

Appellee Van Nood's brief.

-8-

of

necessary to

the common law statute.

without merit and is addressed in ARGUMENTS

He has

This is

SIX and SEVEN of

ARGUMENT ONE

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953
AS AMENDED) THAT THE APPELLEE AND
THE DECEDENT WERE CAPABLE OF GIVING
CONSENT TO A MARRIAGE CONTRACT.

The Appellant Sorensen
Mr.

Van

consent

Nood

and

Ms.

to a marriage contract.

Susan

employed

dispute the fact that
of

giving

The testimony clearly shows

When they first met, Martin was 39

was 32 years of age.
at

not

Gustaveson were capable

the parties were adults.
and

does

They

were

both

gainfully

responsible jobs (Transcript pages 37 and 131).

They maintained bank accounts (Transcript page 4 4 ) , filed tax
returns

(Transcript

property

page

(Transcript

page

into marriages and divorces
facts

show

evidence

6 5 ) , owned

real

and

personal

4 5 ) , and had previously entered
with

other

of ability to enter

persons.
into

a

All these
marriage

contract.

There

is

no

evidence

that

they

were not capable of

entering into such a contract.
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage
contract.

ARGUMENT TWO
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA OF
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
THAT THE APPELLEE AND THE DECEDENT WERE
LEGALLY CAPABLE OF ENTERING A SOLEMNIZED
MARRIAGE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANN. TITLE 30 (1953 AS AMENDED)
Appellant Sorensen does not dispute the fact that Mr.
Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were legally capable of entering
into a solemnized marriage under the provisions of Utah Code
Ann.

Title 30 sets forth the prohibitions to a marriage in

Utah, particularly Utah Code Ann.

30-1-2 (1953 as amended).

None apply to this case.
The prohibitions ares
1.

If a party is afflicted with immune deficiency

syndrome, syphilis, or gonorrhea that is communicable or that
may become communicable.
There is no evidence that either Martin Van Nood nor
Susan Gustaveson had any of these diseases.
2.

Where there is a husband or wife living, from whom

the person marrying has not been divorced.
Both Susan and Martin have living former spouses
(Transcript pages 10 and 37). Both were divorced prior to
meeting each other (Transcript pages 37-8).

Both had been

granted valid final Decrees of Divorce from Utah Courts
(Exhibits D-l and D-2).

-to-

3. When the male or female is under 18 years of age
unless consent is obtained as provided in Section 30-1-9.
It is uncontroverted that both Martin and Susan were
over 18 years of age at the time they entered into their
marriage contract.
4.

When the male or female is under 14 years of age.

It is undisputed that both Martin and Susan were over 18
years of age at the time they entered into their marriage
contract.
5.

Between a divorced person and any person other than

the one from whom the divorce was secured until the divorce
decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is taken, until
after the affirmation of the decree.
It is undisputed that both Martin Van Nood and Susan
Gustaveson had received final Decrees of Divorce prior
to their entering into their marriage relationship.
(Exhibits D-l and D-2)
The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage
contract.

-1 1 -

ARGUMENT THREE

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953
AS AMENDED) THAT APPELLEE AND THE
DECEDENT COHABITATED

Appellant Sorensen does

not

dispute

Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson cohabitated.

the fact that Mr.
Many and varied are

the witnesses that corroborated this fact of the case.

Karen

Gal legos

was questioned about this on page 95 of

the Transcript.
Q:

And were you aware when they became—started

living together?
As

Yes.

I was.

Another witness, Mr.

Harley Sells, when asked if he was

aware that the parties were living together
117) responds:

On

page

(Transcript page

"Yes, I was".

125

of the Transcript, Witness Jet Kensington

testifies to this point.
Q:

Do you—do you know

of

your

own knowledge that he

did move in with her?
A: Oh, absolutely, yes.
There were several more people at the trial that covered
-12-

the cohabitation matter in their testimony.

However,

in an

effort toward brevity only one more will be mentioned here.

A long time acquaintance of Mr. Van Nood and a co-worker
of Ms. Gustaveson's

responds simply when asked the questions

(Transcript page 132).
Q:

Did you become aware that they were living together?

As

I did.

Other

testimony

cohabitation, Martin

verified
and

Susan

that
engaged

as

same

bedroom

at

lived with Martin and

of

their

in a life together

including sexual activity (Transcript page
the

part

4 4 ) . They shared

home as testified to by Julia Tso who
Susan

for several years.

(Transcript

page 141-2).

The Court correctly applied these facts
conclusion
contract.

that

the

parties

had

entered

in reaching its
into a marriage

ARGUMENT FOUR

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953
AS AMENDED) THAT THE APPELLEE AND
THE DECEDENT MUTUALLY ASSUMED MARITAL
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS
A.

MUTUAL ASSUMPTION OF MARITAL RIGHTS:
Ms. Gustaveson and Mr. Van Nood assumed the

following marital rights

which Appellant Sorensen does not

dispute:
1.

The parties lived together for nearly four and one-

half years.
2.

(Transcript pages 41-2).

The parties maintained a home for themselves and

Martin's minor daughter for two years. (Transcript pages 1401).

They established a home for themselves first in a house

owned by Martin and then in a condominium owned by Susan for
another two and one-half years.
3.

They cooked, cleaned, gardened, socialized and

travelled as a married couple.
4.

(Transcript page 42).

(Transcript page 42).

They attended family gatherings together; birthdays,

anniversaries, weddings, graduations, the birth of their
grandchild, all as husband and wife. (Transcript page 141).
5.

They purchased presents for family and friends

together as husband and wife.
6.

(Transcript page 9 6 ) .

They owned property individually as is a married
-14-

couple's right under Utah Code Ann.
7.

30-2-1 (1953 as amended)

The received wages for their personal labor and kept

separate bank accounts which is a marital right under Utah
Code Ann. 30-2-4 (1953 as amended).
8.

They shared in family expenses.

9.

They shared a sex life together.

10.

They used each other's surnames on occasion but

normally went by their prior names as is a right under the
law.
When Susan Gustaveson's employer was on the stand
(Transcript pages 132-3) and the subject of mutual marital
rights, duties and obligations came up, this is a portion of
what was said:
Q:

And do you know of your own knowledge whether Susan

Gustaveson had any interest in a pension plan?
As

She did.

Q:

And do you know of your own knowledge who the

beneficiary of that pension plan was?
A:

It was Marty.

During the cross examination of Karen Gallegos, she was
asked, on page 109 of the Transcript, about this subject.
Q: (Walsh)

Do you know if she and Marty ever mutually

assumed any marital debts, duties and obligations?
A:

That says marital rights.

Q:

Okay.

A:

So I would say yes.

This subject can take on many meanings to different
-1 S-

people as there seems to be no pre-determined set of behavior
patterns that will insure that a couple are

indeed assuming

marital rights, duties and obligations.

Susan Gustaveson's former father-in-law tends to see
these as domestic functions in the running of a household.
His testimony on this segment of the statute covers this
aspect.

(Transcript page 1 4 8 ) .

Q:

Did it appear to be a functional

home?

A:

Oh, yes.

Q:

And were they the type of tasks that you'd expect a

husband and wife to be performing?
A:

Yes.

On the other hand when Julia Tso testified, she covered
everything from the parties sex lives to Christmas
activities. (Transcript pages 141-2).
Q:

Did she and you father share the same bedroom?

As

Yes, they did.

Q:

Did they share the household

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you exchange birthday and Christmas presents

responsibilities?

with Susan?
A:

Yes, I did.

G:

And did she exchange them as your

A:

As my mother.

-16-

as what?

B.

MUTUAL ASSUMPTION OF MARITAL DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS:
1.

They provided for their mutual living expenses in

maintaining several homes throughout the course of their
marital relationship, providing for mutual food, shelter,
clothing, entertainment, etc.
2.

They jointly cared for Mr. Van Nood's minor child

for over two years.
3.

(Transcript pages 44-5).

(Transcript page 42,57,140-1).

They attended family and work related social events

together as husband and wife.

(Transcript pages

58, 96,

146) .
4.
wife.

They corresponded and recieved mail as husband and
(Transcript page 55).

5.

The parties purchased presents for each other and

for family members and friends as husband and wife.
(Transcript page 9 6 ) .
6.

Susan travelled to be with Martin three or four

times per week during their marriage relationship when his
work took him away from their home for six weeks.

The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage
contract.

ARGUMENT FIVE
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CRITERIA
OF UTAH CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 AS
AMENDED) THAT THE APPELLEE AND THE
DECEDENT HELD THEMSELVES OUT AND
ACQUIRED A UNIFORM AND GENERAL
REPUTATION AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
The witnesses for Martin

Van

Nood were a diverse group

of people who knew Martin and Susan very well.
Mr. Van

Nood's business partner?

a neighbor of Martin

and

They included

Ms. Gustaveson's employer;

Susan's;

the

former

husband of

Susan;

the former father—in-law of Susan;

friend;

Martin's daughter, as well as Martin himself.

EACH

Susan's

closest

TESTIFIED THAT THE PARTIES HELD THEMSELVES OUT AND

ACQUIRED A UNIFORM

AND

GENERAL

REPUTATION

AS

HUSBAND AND

WIFE.

Witness Van Nood testifies on page 58 of the Transcript,
when he is asked if he held himself out as the husband of
Susan.
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And did she hold herself out to be your wife?

A:

Yeah.

Karen Gal legos was a very close friend to Ms. Gustaveson
and knew how she felt in this matter.

She testifies

concerning how parties held themselves. (Transcript pages 96)
Q:

Did—did it appear to you that—did they hold
-18-

themselves out to you as husband and wife?
A:

Yes.

Qs

Did she ever state to you that she felt

married

to

Martin?
Mr. Sells was associated with Martin Van Nood through
business.

He observed the relationship between Susan and

Martin over the course of six years.

He felt that the couple

definitely held themselves out as husband and wife.
(Transcript pages 118-21).
Qs

Did

Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson hold themselves

out to you to be husband and wife?
A:

Yes.

Basically, yes.

Q:

And when they came

to

your

home,

did

they

hold

themselves out to be husband and wife?
A:

Yes.

Later

on in his testimony during cross

examination

he

expounds.
Qs

(Walsh)

What does it mean then when you answer the

question in the affirmative that they held themselves
out as husband and

wife?

What

did

they

do

to

make you

believe that they were husband and wife?
A:

They did everything a husband and wife would do

-19-

except they didn't have a marriage certificate as far
as I know.

When

asked

directly,

Jet Kensington,

Susan and Martin affirms their status.

a

neighbor

to

(Transcript pages

125-6).
Q:

And

did

they,

while

you knew them and while they

were living as your neighbors, hold themselves out to
be husband and wife?
A:

Wei 1, yes.

Mr. Melvin Gustaveson obviously knew Susan well due to
their having developed a father-daughter relationship from
the late 1970's.

Further he was privy to witnessing the

parties behavior not only at family gatherings and with
friends but also when they traveled together.

(Transcript

pages 147,51).

Q:

And when you were travelling together, did they hold

themselves out as husband and wife?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And at home here, as far as you know, did

they hold

themselves out as husband and wife?

A:

I'm

sure they did, yes.

They did as far as we were

concerned.
Even further evidence is added on cross examination.
-20-

Q:

(Walsh)

Well, did you ever know Susan to go by the

last name of Van Nood?
As
us,

Oh, yes.

she

had

When—when they were in San Francisco with

done

that

at

the

hotel, or motel they were

staying at.
The one witness that
Gustaveson
ex-husband.

was

most

with

felt and held herself in a relationship
William

friend

to

how Ms.
was

her

Gustaveson remained close to Susan even

many years after their divorce.
a good

familiar

Subsequently, he also became

Mr. Van Nood.

Being in

an

advantageous

position to know, he was a well qualified witness with no axe
to

grind.

His

undisputed

weight because of this.
Q:

testimony

carries

significant

(Transcript page 157).

And do Martin—did Martin and Susan hold themselves

out to you to be husband and wife?
As

In every sense...

The Court correctly applied these facts in reaching its
conclusion that the parties had entered into a marriage
contract.

ARGUMENT SIX

APPELLANT SORENSEN'S CONCLUSIONS
ARE BASED ON SEVERAL MISAPPLIED
STATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED
AT TRIAL

Several factual errors

occur

in

Appellant

Sorensen's

brief which distort the facts and evidence as testified to in
the lower Court.
Sorensen

states

that

Nood and Ms. Gustaveson

was

the relationship between Mr. Van
"somewhat rocky as she moved in

with him and then lived with someone else,

and moved back in

with Mr. Van Nood" (Apellant's Brief page 4 ) .
This is not the fact.
The reference is taken out of context.
parties relationship

smooth

as

dicussed

Not only was the
on page 65 of the

Transcript.
Q:

Was

there any rift in your marital—(relationship)?

A: None
When

the

Apellant

lived with someone else
knew about her.
Nood

Sorensen
merely

talks

about Susan having

demonstrates how little they

The transcript clearly

is

about

(Tso), Martin's daughter and not about Ms.

Julia Van
Gustaveson.

Julia lived with Martin and Susan for several years with only
one brief exception.

-22-

There is no testimony in any portion of
referring

the

transcript

to a "rocky" relationship between the Decedent and

the Appellee.

In fact, the evidence is of a stable and happy

relationship.

The

neighbor

lady,

Jet Kensington, testified

to

the

parties being a loving couple that showed great affection and
devotion to one another.

She

states

on

page

126

of the

Transcript:
Q:

Can you describe anything you observed when you were

outdoors at your home?
As

Well,

I

observed

but in an unobtrusive
tended

way.

a very—I want to say committed,
They

were

to touch shoulders or communicate

very private.
the

way

men

And
and

women will if they're close, and confident of each other.

Appellant

Sorensen

argues, "Did the parties file their

taxes consistent with a common law marriage, or did they file
single returns and pay outrageously more tax, because they in
fact

did

not hold themselves out as husband and wife" (Page

10 of Apellant brief).

There is no evidence as to the amount of income, assets,
or expenses of either Mr.

Van Nood nor

there

assuming

is

no

basis

for

that

Ms.

Gustaveson,

Ms. Gustaveson, by

exercising her marital right of filing an individual tax
-23-

so

return, was paying "outrageou ly more tax".

On page 47 of Appellant brief, they again misinterpret
the facts. Appellant Sorensen states:

"Not only did

essentially all who testified state that they had not
acquired a "general reputation as husband and wife...".
Is this a correct statement?

No, it is not.

The only witness that made anything close to statements
like this was Sorensen, himself.

His testimony, as it

appears on page 34 of the Transcript, is as follows:
Q: (Walsh) Did y o u — w e r e you ever under the
understanding that she (Susan) was married to Martin Van
Nood?

was

A:

No.

Q:

Do you know anybody that had the belief that she

married to Martin Van Nood?
A:

No.

Reviewing the one other witness (Janice Sorensen) who
had a similar story to tell indicates that she had no contact
with Ms. Gustaveson for at least three and a half years.
Tom Sorensen did not have any contact with Ms.
Gustaveson for at least the final six months of her life.
fact, even though he was her only living relative, and that
they lived only seventeen blocks apart.
35).

-24-

(Transcript pages

In

Q: (Mr. Dalgliesh) Mr. Sorensen, in the last four years
what would you estimate the number of conversations you
had with your sister?
A:

Three of four.

Qs

So you weren't close at all?

A:

No.

Qs

Did she instigate any of the phone conversations?

As

No.

Q:

Did she come to your home?

A:

No.

Q:

So, in—in four years, you've only had approximately

We'd just keep in touch.

She didn't.

four conversations with her?
A:

Off and on, yeah.

Therefore, neither the Appellant Sorensen nor his wife
would have any idea as to the marital reputation of Ms.
Gustaveson and Mr. Van Nood at any time during the over six
year relationship of the parties.
The Court applied the correct interpretation to these
facts in reaching its conclusion that the parties had entered
into a marriage contract.

ARGUMENT SEVEN
THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED
NO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS TO THE FACTS
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE COMMON LAW
MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP EXCEPT BY UTAH
CODE ANN. 30-1-4.5 (1953 AS AMENDED),
LEAVING THE PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE
VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE TO THE TRIAL
COURT USING THE SAME GENERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE AS FACTS IN OTHER CASES

Appellant Sorensen

states

in

his

argument

brief page 5) that the Legislature required
do

what

other

married

couples

(Apellant

that the parties

do, like borrow money, own

assets jointly, and have common debts, etc.

No where in the statute

does

it

require

find such specific facts to determine if

the Court to

a marriage contract

exists.

Sorensen

further

argues,

State Legislature contemplates
checking
cars,

accounts,
or

real

"It
was

is
that

savings accounts,

property

relationship tomorrow,

not

-

etc.,

just

clear that what the
the

parties share

purchase
together

items

like

reflecting

a

what is convenient today."

(Appellant's brief page 7)

This argument has no basis in fact.

Appellee

Van

Nood

has previously presented under "ARGUMENT SIX" that there were
good and valid reasons for Mr. Van Nood and Ms. Gustaveson
-26-

not to conduct their
required
some

as indicated above.

that one conduct one's financial

hypothetical

marriage contract.
jointly

affairs

owned

property...yet

affairs

It is not
to

meet

intent

of the Legislature to establish a

Many

solemnized married couples have no

assets, no bank accounts,
they are married.

no

cars

or

real

Why should it be otherwise

with this couple?

Susan Gustaveson's former
their

solemnized

husband testified that during

marriage, he and Susan

separate credit and banking accounts.

always

maintained

(Transcript page 153)

ARGUMENT EIGHT

APPELLEE VAN NOOD SHOULD BE AWARDED
SINGLE OR DOUBLE HIS COSTS AND
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AS PROVIDED
BY UTAH Rules App. P. 33 (a)

Appellant

Sorensen

has

conceded

challenging the Findings of Fact.
would

that

he

is

not

Should he have done so, he

have had to demonstrate that despite the evidence, the

trial Court's findings

ar&

so

lacking

in support as to be

against the clear weight of the evidence,
clearly

erroneous.

thus

making

them

IJT, res Estate of Bartel 1, 776 P.2d, 885,

886 (Utah 1989).

The trial Court heard evidence which supported a finding
that

each

element

amended) had

been

of

Utah

met

Code Ann.

30-1-4,5

the

best position to determine the

witnesses

and

to

as

by the Appellee Van Nood to validate

the marriage between him and Susan Gustaveson.
in

(1953

weigh

and

assess

The Court was

credibility
any

of

the

conflicts in the

evidence.

Since the arguments
that

the

support

made

by the Appellant Sorensen are

Legislature intended more of
a

conclusion

that

different

facts

to

the marriage existed, and since

Appellant Sorensen has not cited any Legislative intent or
-28-

statutory authority
that
should
fees.

to

support

this contention, it appears

the appeal lacks legal and factual
award

Appellee

Van

Nood

Utah Rules App. P. 35(a),

_r>o_

merit.

The

Court

double costs and attorney

CONCLUSION

To establish a common law marriage in Utah one must meet
the specific requirements of Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 (1953 as
amended).

Each element has been duly met by the Appellee Van

Nood •

The Appellate Courts
4.5

have reviewed Utah Code Ann. 30-1-

(1953 as amended) in only four cases.

upon

this

case.

(Utah App.
App.

See

Mattes

1988), Barber

1990),

Walters vs.

vs.

Barber.

64

1177

134, (Utah
(Utah

App.
1335

1991).

preponderance

of

evidence

Martin

met

Van

the five

Nood

October, 1992).
the

four

and

period.

Their

terminated by Ms. Gustaveson's

lived

by
of

a
the

together

one-half years (June, 1988 to

Utah's common law statute

entire

has

criteria

Martin Van Nood and Susan Gustaveson

as man and wife for

during

792 P.2d

Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d

In this case the Appellee

statute.

Olearain« 759 P.2d

Walters, 812 P.2d

1991) and Van Per Stappen vs.
(Utah App.

vs.

None bear directly

life

untimely

was

in existence

together was only
death.

They shared

and maintained a home the themselves and for much of the time
for

Mr.

Van

Nood's minor child.

their own support and

for

the

They jointly provided for

child's

themselves out and acquired a uniform and

support.

They held

general

reputation

as husband and wife, as was testified to by neighbors,
-30-

business

employers

and

by

friends

parties-

The decedent's former

and associates of both

father-in-law, the now adult

child of the couple, and others.

They traveled and socialized as husband
received

mail

as

husband

and wife.

household duties as husband and wife.

and wife.

They

They performed normal
They gave and recieved

gifts as husband and wife.

Susan
that

they

Gustaveson

and Martin Van Nood fully

had not undergone a formal marriage ceremony.

is probable that they
marriage
Yet

they

understood

statute

were

not even aware of the common law

that the State of Utah

conducted

their

lives and their marital

It

recently

adopted.

affairs, their family and social
way

that

to

have

Ms. Gustaveson used the name Van Nood on occasion.

This

clearly

demonstrates

relationship
they

considered

in

such

a

themselves

entered into a committed contract of marriage.

is not an indication

of

lacl*

of

a marriage contract.

She

owned bank accounts and real property, and held credit cards,
all

in her former married name.

Likewise, Mr. Van Nood held

his own credit and other assets as Martin Van Nood only.
of these items they owned prior to their relationship
having commenced.

-31-

All

Susan Gustaveson's credit was good.
was

not so good.

Martin

Van

Nood's

It is consistent with her duty as a spouse

to keep some good

credit

for

the

family

and

not

create

potential problems by changing the name on these accounts and
on

her

real

jeopardize

Susan's

accounts.
whose

property.

Conversely, Mr. Van Nood would not

credit

standing

by

combining

credit

It is a fact that many professional married women,

marriages

are

solemnized maintain a surname different

than that of their spouse.

The fact that Ms. Gustaveson

did

not

married on government documents is not
case.

It

is

only

this

business

was
forms.

the

marriage,

documents

in

this

She knew she

and in all honesty felt

only proper answer
These

herself as

dispositive

one fact to be considered.

did not have a solemnized
that

list

do

on

government

not

and

ask, "Have you

entered into a contract of common law marriage?", or "Are you
a common law wife?", or even "Has your marriage

been

proved

by a Court of Administrative agency of the State of Utah?".

The

parties

clearly had a marriage contract. They were

committed, had exchanged
the

minor

grandmother

child
and

a token pledge of marriage, treated

as mother and father,
grandfather;

themselves to solemnization

and

and
had

her
even

child

as

committed

of their marriage contract.

The

couple were mature adults, fully committed to each other and

to

the

rights,

relationship.

duties

and

obligations

of

a

marriage

And for four and one-half years fulfilled that

marriage contract.
The

lower

Court's application

reaching

its

conclusion

marriage

contract

is

of

law that

correct.

Judge

of
the

the

facts

parties

Moffat's

had

in
a

reasoning

appears in the Transcript at pages 163-8. (See addendum 3)

Appellee Martin Van

Nood respectfully requests that the

ruling by the Honorable Richard Moffat
upheld

holding

that

Mr.

Van

of the lower Court be

Nood and Ms. Gustaveson were

lawfully married at the date of death of Susan Gustaveson.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

L189

(6) between persons of the same sex.

1991

0-1-2.1.

Validation of marriage to a p e r s o n
subject to chronic epileptic fits w h o
had not been sterilized.
All marriages, otherwise valid and legal, contracted prior to the effective date of this act, to which
either party was subject to chronic epileptic fits and
who had not been sterilized, as provided by law, are
hereby validated and legalized in all respects as
though such marriages had been duly and legally
contracted in the first instance.
1963
30-1-2.2. Validation of interracial marriages.
All marriages, otherwise valid and legal, contracted prior to the effective date of this act, to which
one of the parties of the marriage was subject to disability to marry on account of Section 30-1-2(5), (6),
Utah Code Annotated 1953 [prior to amendment by
Chapters 42 and 43, Laws 1963], are hereby valid and
made lawful in all respects as though such marriages
had been duly and legally contracted in the first instance.
1965
30-1-3.

Marriage in belief of death or divorce of
former spouse — Issue legitimate.
When a marriage is contracted in good faith and in
the belief of the parties that a former husband or
wife, then living and not legally divorced, is dead or
legally divorced, the issue of such marriage born or
begotten before notice of the mistake shall be the legitimate issue of both parties.
1953
30-1-4. Validity of foreign marriages.
Marriages solemnized in any other country, state
or territory, ifvalid where solemnized, are valid here.
1953

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage n o t solemnized.
( D A marriage which is not solemnized according
to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a
contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) a r e capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties,
and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband a n d wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one
year following the termination of that relationship.
Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section m a y be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as
facts in other cases.
1987
30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized person — Validity.
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for
want of such authority, if consummated in the belief
of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and t h a t they have been lawfully married.
1953

30-1-6. Who may solemnize marriages — Certificate.

30-1

(a) ministers, rabbis, or priests of any religio
denomination in regular communion with a:
religious society, who are 18 years of age or old*
(b) t h e governor, mayors of municipalities,
justice, judge, or commissioner of a court
record or a judge of a court not of record of tl
state of Utah;
(c) judges or magistrates of the United State
and
(d) t h e county clerk of any county in the stat
if t h e clerk chooses to solemnize marriages.
(2) A judge or magistrate who holds office in Uta
may solemnize marriages when retired, under rule
set by t h e Supreme Court.
(3) A certificate of marriage shall be given to th
couple a n d shall show t h e name of the county fror
which t h e license is issued and date of its issuance
(4) In this section, "judge or magistrate of t h
United States" means a justice of the United State;
Supreme Court, a judge of a court of appeals, a dis
trict court, or any court created by a n act of Congres*
the judges of which are entitled to hold office during
good behavior, a judge of a bankruptcy court or a t a i
court, or a United States magistrate.
1983
30-1-7. Marriage licenses.
No marriage may be solemnized without a license
issued by t h e county clerk of any county of the state
of U t a h not more t h a n 30 days prior to t h e date of
solemnization of the marriage.
1987
30-1-8. Application for license — Contents.
(1) A marriage license may be issued by the county
clerk only after a n application has been filed in his
office, requiring t h e following information:
(a) t h e full names of the parties, including the
maiden name of the female;
(b) t h e current address of each party;
(c) t h e date a n d place of birth (town or city,
county, state or country, if possible);
(d) t h e names of their respective parents, including t h e maiden name of the mother;
(e) t h e birthplaces of fathers and mothers
(town or city, county, state or country, if possible); a n d
(f) the distinctive race or nationality of each of
the parents.
(2) If t h e female is a widow, her maiden name shall
be shown in brackets.
(3) If one or both of the parties is under 16 years of
age, the clerk shall provide them with a standard
petition on a form approved by the Judicial Council to
be presented to the juvenile court to obtain the authorization required by Section 30-1-9.
1992
30-1-9.

Marriage by minors — Consent of parent or guardian — Juvenile court authorization.
(1) If at the time of applying for a license the maie
or the female is under 18 years of age, and not before
married, a license may not be issued without:

(a) t h e consent of his or h e r father, mother, or
guardian personally given or certified in writing
to t h e clerk over his or her signature; and
(b) if under 16 years of age, the written authorization to marry from a judge of the court exercising juvenile jurisdiction in the county where
either partv to thp mow*-™ -— :J - np"

Rule 32

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in State v. Erickson, 148 Utah Adv.
Rep. 45 (Ct. App. 1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.

Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 941.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979.
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
A.L.R.3d 1221.
Right to interest pending appeal, 15
A.L.R.3d 411.

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Key Numbers. — Interest «• 39(2).

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
464

that has been presented was that these peoole did feel that
Martin and Susan were a married couple.
THE COURT:

Well, I've got to say that

30-1-4.5 is not a model of clarity as far as how you

4

establish this relationship or i t — h o w you establish the

5

result of a relationship.

But let's — let's talk about it just

a minute.
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

I

A, there's no doubt about the fact that they were
both capable of giving consent, and there's no doubt about B,
they were legally—each were legally capable of entering into
a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this statute,
if they wanted to, this chapter.

And C, there's no doubt that

there was no cohabitation.
So, as the parties hereto have been working on and

15

as Mr. Walsh has pointed out, the questions are the provisions

16
yj

of D and E, Sub D and Sub E. Well, let's talk about what
mutually assumed marital rights, duties and obligations means.

18

Now, I recognize that both of these interrelate, the same

19

act or series of acts or the same event can have a — a meaning

20

for both of these two subsections.

21

As a matter of fact, even C, in and of itself has

22

some bearing, to my way of thinking upon D and E. Cohabita-

23

tion, I don't take to be a one or a two-night relationship

24

between parties, maybe not even a two or three-week relation-

25

ship between parties where a man and woman live together and
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engage in sexual relationships and even do all the things
that people do; but when that goes on for a long period of
3
4

time, then that cohabitation takes on a--a period—or a sense
I of permanency.
I don't agree with what has obviously been the

6

I thrust b y — b y the applicant here, that is by Mr. Sorensen

rj

that the question of marital rights and duties and obligations

8

means that the parties run out and sign on each other's notes,

9

or that the parties, upon entering into a relationship where

10

they move into somebody's home, immediately the party who

11

moved in goes down and signs on the utilities and those kinds

12

of things.

13
14
15
16

That can be dene, and if it were done, I think

it becomes evidence of the assumption of marital rights,
duties and obligations.

But I think there are other things

which make those assumptions—those—yeah, those assumptions
equally obvious.
The parties here shared money.

17

Martin gave Susan

18

cash.

She made certain payments, he made certain payments.

19

They lived together by reason of those payments being made,

20

whether it was for gas and oil on the one hand and water and

21

power on the other hand, or whatever it might have been.

22

assumed marital rights, duties and obligations in that for a

23

period o f — o f — a long period of time, they shared the same

24

household, they cooked the meals together, they—somebody

25

made the—the beds, and somebody took out the garbage, and
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They

there's even testimony that Martin did—did that.
I don't perceive D to require the same formality
of assumption of marital rights, duties and obligations that
Mr. Walsh has — has —has argued for.

And I think that's where

our difference arises in this case.
I feel the same way about E.

The question has

been asked by Mr. Walsh over and over again, did they ever
tell you that they were married, did they ever say that they
were married?

Well, to acquire a general and uniform

reputation as husband and wife, I don't think requires that
they necessarily have the reputation for having been married.
It is that they act and behave as husbands and wives behave.
The fact that there isn't that little piece of paper that is
signed by a judge or a—other official, authorized to
solemnize marriages has any bearing on it.

Itls how do they

appear to the public?
And the fact that some of that public, some of that
group of friends, that general number of people that we all
know, knows they're not married doesn't change the fact of
their behavior, doesn't change the fact of how they are
regarded in the minds of those that know them and know them
intimately.
It seems to me that the testimony here is just
overwhelming that this couple lived together, that they did
assume these mutual rights and duties and they did hold
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themselves out as having that relationship.

And I think when

you take the testimony of Susan's first husband, which was
I the testimony here today that was not in any way controverted
about why and how they—she didn ! t want to marry—at least
didn't want to enter into a formal marriage relationship,
that doesn't change the fact that they held themselves out as
-

I husband and wife, and the thing that this statute requires
isn't that they hold themselves out as married, is that they

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

acquire a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
And I think a reputation as a husband and wife is a different
thing from saying, Yes, we're married.

I don't think that's

required.
And another thing that I think has to be carried—
has to be borne in mind here, we can talk about these forms
until we're blue in the face, but the fact of the matter is
that there's not a word of testimony before this Court/ and
I would be willing to bet you, that had anybody asked, the
answer would have been:

We didn't even know this statute

existed and if w e did, we had no idea o f — o f how it worked or
what it would do to our relationship.
They couldn't, I don't think, without having had
that knowledge, have said in all honesty, Yes, we're married.
Because in their own minds, in terms of the legal term
"marriage", a. solemnized marriage, they obviously weren't.
So, when somebody who's honest, and I think that we
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all are, as much as we possibly can be; I know how I would
feel if I went down to the--to the—or filed my tax returns
under the circumstances and—and I was not legally married
and didn't realize this statute very likely could put me in
the position of being legally married, I would probably file
single; but--but I don't think that that's any kind of a—of
a change of holding themselves out.

That's done because under

the particular circumstance of those kinds of things, the—
you have to fit into a block, you have to fit into a category
that's been provided by the particular agency involved.
Now, the one place—and I will admit this—where
that—that doesn't hold entirely true is the one where she
marked that—not live-in, either.

And I—I don't understand

that one entirely, other than it may have a general—or it
may have some genesis in the general attitude I've just
expressed.

But even with that, I think the testimony here as

to—as to the relationship of this couple and what they have
done in the public and the way they have behaved between
themselves in their relationships with other persons, given
the testimony of the former husband, who hasn't got a thing
to gain by this, the testimony of the former father-in-law,
who almost—I guess I'll say it, the relationship of a
father to this—to this girl, and so on, I just can'.t—I
can't come to any conclusion other than that the terms and
the conditions of the statute have been met and that the
167
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' parties, that the legal relationship of- -of a marriage should
| be held to—to have existed.
3

That will be the orde r of the Court.

4

MR. WALSH:

Thank yc>u, your Honor,

5

THE COURT.: Court 1 s in recess.

6

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded. )
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WILLIAM J. M. DALGLIESH #810
243 EAST FOURTH SOUTH #30 3
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: C801L 532-6536
ATTORNEY FOR
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
SUSAN RANAE SORENSEN GUSTAVESON:
Case No.925901280 ES
Deceased.
:
Judge:

Richard Moffat

This natter came en regularly for trial on the 25th day of March, 1993,
before the Honorable Ridaard Mbffatt, one of the judges of the above-entitled
Court. Petitioner, Qrin T. Sorensen appeared in person and with Counsel,
John Walsh.. Respondeat, Martin Van Nood appeared in person and with
Counsel, William J. M. Dalgliesh. The matter at issue was an objection
filed by Martin Van Nood to the appointment of Qrin T. Sorensen as the
personal representative of the Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson,
on the basis that Mr. Van Nood has priority of appointment as the
comrrui law husband of the decedent, over that of Mr. Sorensen, the
brother of .the decedent. The trial was held to declare that Mr. Van Nood
was the husband of the decedent, under the provisions of §30-1-4.5,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended; and that the marriage was legal
and valid.

Hie Court, having heard the testimony of the petitioner,
respondent and numerous other witnesses, and having considered the
evidence, including the exhibits submitted by the parties, and being
fully advised in the premises, new makes, adopts and ifles its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent, Martin Van Nood, and the decedent, Susan
Gustaveson lived together on a constant basis, as husband and wife,
from June, 1988 until the death of Susan Gustaveson on October 19,
1992.
2.

Respondent and the decedent first lived together in the

heme of the respondent, and then moved to the home of the decedent in
May, 1991, where they resided until Susan Gustaveson's death.
3. At the time the respondent and the decedent conmenced
residing together, the respondent was 41 years of age, and the
decedent was 36 years of age, both of legal age to contract a marriage.
4. Both the respondent and the decedent were divorced frcm
other persons at the time they commenced their marriage relationship
with each, other.

Respondent's divorce frcm his first spouse was final on

Octcber 1, 1982, and the decedent's divorce from her first spouse
was final on February/ 22, 1982.
5. This action was brought within one year follcwing the
termination of the relationship of the respondent and the decedent,
said termination caused by the death of Susan Gustaveson.

6.

That the respondent and the decedent cohabited for a

period of approxinately four and one half years; and had sexual
relations with each other during that time.
7. That the respondent and the decedent mutually assumed
maritial rights, duties, and obligations during their relationship,
in that they did the following acts together:
a. They engaged in a sexual relationship.
b.

They maintained.'their hone together for themselves

for four and one half years; and they raised the minor daughter of
the respondent together for threeyears, until she married and moved
from the family home. The decedent treated respondent's daughter
as her cwn daughter, .and considered respondent's grandchild as her
own grandchild.
c.

Each contributed financial support to the household,

expenses; and they purchased furniture and hone inprovements for
themselves.
d.

They received mail together.

e. They exchanged gifts with each other and family
members; and received gifts from family members.
f.

They shared in the normal household duties of

a married couple: cooking, cleaning, hate repairs, care of a child,
travel, entertainment both in the heme and attendance of social
activities, outside of the heme with friends. and co-workers.

g.

The decedent contributed financial support to

the respondents business by purchasing the business a conputer.
h.

They shared activities as husband and wife with

respondent^ child, such as camping, attendance as "parents" at
the childfs high school graduation, marriage, and birth of her
child.
8.

The respondent and the decedent held themselves out and acquired

a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.in the following
manner:
a.

Neighbors considered them to be husband and wife.

b.

Fellas co-workers and the employer of the decedent

and the former husband of the decedent and his parents regarded them
as husband and wife.
c«

Travel arrangements were made as husband and wife.

d.

They shopped together as husband and wife for household

wares., and for a new hone.
e.

They held themselves out as husband and wife to their

friends, relatives, and general public.
£.

That the parties made an oral contract of marriage

between themselves.
10. . That each was capable of giving consent to a marriage
between themselves.

If la t the marriage of the respondent and the decedent
w a s not solemnized.
Vrr.r
capable oz

the resDcncp*'^

anr^r—^

JL*:LV_ W*

nri M"*.e flpredent w e r e each, legally

solemnized marriage 'under the provisions

of Title 3 0 , Utah, Code Annotated, 1953, as
• ~'--

amended.

r rsen is the brother "',1 i-he decedent,

fiuii the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court new malsi s ,
adopts and files Its:
i 'i 'flOiJSlONb UF LAW

uruscjLction in this matter.
i respondent, and the decedent entered .into a marriage,
which, was. not solenhize*"'
^

m

nil marriage.

. each,, was ...capable., of giving consent to a solemnized

marriage
a o ; .-.
marriage u:aei

TT:**

•.

-L..

altering a solemnized

provisions of Title 30, Utah Cede Annotated, 1953,

as amended.
!.

h e parties cohabited.
each mutually assumed 'marital rights, duties, and

obligations.
7.

Ilia, t "'the respondent and the decedent held themselves

out as and have acquired a 'uniform and general reputation as husband

"Hut .in '"YdfM"" ,.iiLd Juduiient should be entered, declaring
that .Martin Vai i Nood and Susan .'Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson 'where
validly .married at 'the time and date of ttv d^ath >>f Sir~.i. I'HI W
Sor^->*-

...
J: '•his matter should be referred back ~o *-*\^

probate calendr.*' "or determs*
r e p ^ ^ i . ,;...„

:

: -

persona...

„ L ^ Estate of Susan Ranae Sorensen Gustaveson,

based 'upon, 'the Order and Judgment to 'be entered herein.
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